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GUTTING PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS:
FRIEDRICHS V. CALIFORNIA
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
JAKE WASSERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,1 public-sector unions
face a constitutional challenge that could lead to their demise. In California,
all public school employees are represented by a union—whether or not
they are union members—and are required to pay an agency fee. This
requirement seems to run contrary to the First Amendment, which generally
prohibits the government from compelling citizens to support the speech
and expressive activities of a private organization. However, in the 1977
case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court found constitutional a
statute that allowed unions to compel dissenting non-union members to pay
agency fees.2 Specifically, the Court held statutes that forced public
employees to pay agency fees did not violate the First Amendment as long
as the agency fees were germane to a union’s bargaining expense and were
unrelated to a union’s political activity.3
In Friedrichs, the Court is being urged to overrule Abood and find that
under the First Amendment, public employees who decline to join a union
cannot be required to pay union agency fees.4 The Court’s ruling in
Friedrichs could have a broad impact on public-sector unions’ financial
health and political clout, as well as politics more broadly.5 This
commentary will discuss the factual and legal background leading up to

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n., 2016 WL 1191684 (2015).
2. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (noting agency fees must be
collected for a purpose related to a union’s duty as the collective-bargaining representative).
3. Id. at 235–36.
4. Brief for Petitioners at 16, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No.14-915 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
5. Amy Howe, Justices return to dispute over union fees for non-members: In Plain English,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:46 AM), htpp://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/justices-return-todispute-over-union-fees-for-non-members-in-plain-english/.
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Friedrichs, analyze each party’s argument and discuss why the Court
should decline to overturn Abood.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual Background
The petitioners in this case are led by Rebecca Friedrichs, who, along
with nine other California public school teachers, objects to being required
to pay an agency fee to a union as a nonmember.6 Respondents include the
local unions, the National Education Association, and the California
Teachers Association. The National Education Association is the nation’s
largest professional union, and is “committed to advancing the cause of
public education.”7 The California Teacher’s Association represents
325,000 public educators in California and is the largest affiliate of the
National Educators Association.8 In addition, California Attorney General
Kamala Harris intervened in the district court proceeding, was an
intervenor in the court of appeals, and is consequently a party to the
proceeding.9
Friedrichs and the nine other school teachers work in school districts
that recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its
employees.10 These districts and the respective unions have entered into
several agreements that establish the terms and conditions of employment
for Friedrichs and other public employees.11 One of these conditions for
employment requires Friedrichs and other public school teachers to either
join a union or allow agency fees to be deducted from their paycheck.12
Because Friedrichs is not a member of a union, she must pay the union an
agency fee.13 The total amount Friedrichs must pay is determined by the
local unions and may be comprised of both chargeable and nonchargeable
expenses.14 A “chargeable” expense is defined as a fee collected for
purposes germane to the union’s “function as the exclusive bargaining
representative.”15 The union has the duty of establishing which expenses
	
  
6. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at ii.
7. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
8. CAL. TEACHERS ASSOC., https://www.cta.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
9. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at iii.
10. Id. at 5–6.
11. Id. at 6–7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Union Respondents at 9, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No.14-915 (U.S. Nov. 6,
2015) [hereinafter Brief for Union Respondents].
15. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3456(a) (West 2011).
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are nonchargeable.16 Under state law, nonmembers must be allowed to
object, or “opt-out,” of paying the nonchargeable expenses—which all
petitioners do—and be charged a reduced agency fee comprised
exclusively of chargeable expenses.17
After determining the annual agency fee, the unions inform all the
school districts that are under agency-shop agreements of the amount due.18
The school districts then automatically deduct from the teachers’ paychecks
the amount due in pro rata shares.19 These deductions are directly sent to
the local unions and the California Teachers Association.20
Agency fees for nonmembers are typically around two percent of a
teacher’s total salary, equating to around $1,000 a year.21 Individuals who
opt-out of paying the nonchargeable expenditures typically pay a reduced
fee of $600 to $650 annually.22
B. Procedural History
From the beginning, this case seemed destined for the Supreme Court.
On April 30, 2013, Friedrichs filed suit in federal district court, challenging
the Respondents’ agency-shop requirements. There, Friedrichs conceded
her case was controlled by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and moved
for judgment on the pleadings against her.23 The Respondents opposed
Friedrichs’s motion and sought discovery to develop an evidentiary record
related to Friedrichs’s claims. The district court rejected Respondents’
motion and granted Friedrichs’s motion for judgment against herself.24
Friedrichs then appealed the district court’s judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.25 Again, she conceded that Abood foreclosed
her Constitutional claim and moved for judgment against herself.26
Respondents opposed this motion, arguing that the Ninth Circuit should
conduct oral arguments and issue a published opinion.27 The Ninth Circuit
	
  
16. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 4, 8.
17. Id.; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (stating that activities
not germane to a union’s duty as a collective bargaining agent may be financed by members and
nonmembers who do not object to those expenditures).
18. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 6.
19. Id. at 6–7.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Union Respondents, supra note 14, at 10–11.
24. Id. at 11.
25. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 8.
26. Id. at 8–9.
27. Id. at 9.
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declined this request and instead summarily affirmed the district court.28
Friedrichs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted her
writ of certiorari on June 30, 2015.29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Exclusive Bargaining and Agency-Shop Agreements
Under California law, a union can become the exclusive bargaining
representative for public school employees in a bargaining unit after
demonstrating “proof of majority support.”30 After a union demonstrates
sufficient support,31 the union becomes the sole representative of all the
public school employees within the bargaining unit for purposes of
bargaining over “wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment.”32 A union’s exclusive representative status
prohibits school districts from bargaining over terms and conditions of
employment with individual employees, or with any other labor
organization.33 Additionally, a union must represent every employee in its
bargaining unit,34 including employees who are not actual members of the
union.35
To discourage employees from “free-riding”—refusing to contribute to
the union, yet retaining the benefits of union representation—California
law enables school districts to enter into agency-shop36 agreements with a
union.37 This agreement empowers school districts to require that all
	
  
28. Id.
29. See Freidrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) (granting certiorari).
30. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3544(a) (West 2011).
31. The specific and detailed requirements for a union to become officially recognized and
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for a group of public employees are not relevant for
this commentary.
32. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3543.2(a)(1) (West 2011); see generally Brief for the Attorney General
of Cal., Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 14-915 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that by law, the
scope of collective bargaining is limited to terms and conditions of employment).
33. See, e.g., Benjamin Wyle, Labor Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive Representation, 7
B.C. L. REV. 783 (1966).
34. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3546(a).
35. See Steele v. Louisville & R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 194 (1944) (“So long as a labor union
assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty . . .
[and it must] represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”).
36. Also known as a “union shop” agreement.
37. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977) (noting an agency-shop
agreement fairly distributes a union’s cost from collective bargaining and “counteracts the incentive that
employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’”).
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employees join the union or pay an agency fee,38 as a condition of
employment.39 Under an agency-shop agreement, employers are mandated
to deduct from the nonmember’s salary an agency fee that ideally
represents that employee’s fair share of the union’s chargeable and
nonchargeable activities.40
B. First Amendment Implications of Agency-Shop Agreements
The First Amendment protects individuals’ freedom of speech,41 their
freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, and their freedom to
refrain from doing so.42 Absent safeguards, agency-shop agreements have
the ability to violate nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.43
In Abood, the Court recognized that forcing employees to contribute to
a union impacts their First Amendment rights because certain employees
may have a number of ideological objections to union activity.44 For
example, “[o]ne individual might disagree with a union policy of
negotiating limits on the right to strike . . . or might have economic or
political objections to the unionism itself.”45 However, the Court also
recognized that the union’s duty to bargain collectively on behalf of all
employees46 “carries with it great responsibilities” and comes at a
substantial cost.47 The Abood Court found a compromise, and held the First
Amendment prohibits compelling nonmembers to pay agency fees that are
not collected for purposes germane to a union’s role as the “exclusive
bargaining representative.”48
In the subsequent case Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association,49 the
Court established that state statutes that enable unions to collect from
dissenters agency fees that are germane to their role as a bargaining agent
are justified because they serve the government’s “vital policy interest in
labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders.’”50
	
  
38. Also known as a “fair share service fee.”
39. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 2.
40. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3546(a) (West 2011).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
43. See id. at 234 (noting that because petitioners are being “compelled to make, rather than
prohibited from making” contributions, it is “no less an infringement of their constitutional rights”).
44. Id. at 222.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 221 (noting the union is required to represent all employees, “union and nonunion”).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 235–36.
49. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
50. Id. at 522.
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C. The Legal Context Leading up to Friedrichs
Although Abood remains a controlling decision—and has been since
1977—two recent Court decisions hinted that Abood may be in jeopardy.51
In Knox v. SEIU Local 1000,52 Justice Alito and the majority questioned the
constitutionality of agency-shop agreements.53 They stated that “acceptance
of the free-rider argument as a justification for compelling nonmembers” to
pay an agency fee is “something of an anomaly.”54 In other words,
compelled agency fees burden non-members’ First Amendment rights, and
that burden might not be outweighed by a State’s interest in preventing
free-riding.
Perhaps sensing the Court’s trepidation towards upholding the
constitutionality of agency-shop agreements, non-union workers in Harris
v. Quinn55 seized the moment and asked the Court to overturn Abood.
Justice Alito again wrote the Court’s opinion, which held that Abood did
not apply to the facts in Harris, and consequently refused to overrule it.56
Nevertheless, Justice Alito and the majority wrote four pages highlighting
what they deemed problematic with Abood, arguing it is a “bedrock
principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person in
this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he
or she does not wish to support.”57
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Should the Court Overrule Abood?
1. Friedrichs’s Argument
Friedrichs’s first argument is very simple: the underlying compromise
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education—allowing unions to collect agency
fees from nonmembers for the purpose of collective bargaining but
prohibiting charges for political activities—is constitutionally indefensible.
	
  
51. Lyle Denniston, New Challenge to Public Employee Unions, Made Simple, SCOTUSBLOG,
(August 24, 2015, 12:08 am), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/new-challenge-to-public-employeeunions-made-simple/.
52. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
53. See id. at 2282.
54. Id. at 2290.
55. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
56. See id. at 2638 (finding that agency-shop agreements are not chargeable to employees who
were not exclusively employed by the state); see also id. at 2641 (noting the rationales supporting fair
share agreements did not apply when the union’s bargaining was limited to those terms and conditions
of employment controlled by the state).
57. Id. at 2644.
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She contends Abood is unsustainable because, due to the broad fiscal
impact of union bargaining, everything that a public-sector union does is
political in nature.58 Thus, it follows that any compelled agency fee
violates a nonmember’s First Amendment right not to pay for political
activities to which they object because whenever a union bargains with the
government, it is a “quintessentially political act.”59
Friedrichs also contends the Court should overrule Abood because it is
a “jurisprudential outlier”60 and “irreconcilable with [the Supreme] Court’s
decision in every related First Amendment context.”61 She states that the
Court has recently held that the freedom to speak, or refrain from speaking,
triggers exacting review, regardless of “whether the government is
regulating its citizenry at large or requiring its employees to support and
affiliate with particular political entities.”62 Therefore, it is “clear that
exacting scrutiny applies where, as here, a state compels its public-school
teachers” to pay agency fees.63
Friedrichs further argues the “compelling interests” proffered in Abood
and Lehnert to support compelled subsidization of collective bargaining—
promoting labor peace and preventing free-riding—do not withstand the
required scrutiny.64 First, citing Abood, Friedrichs defines the government’s
interest in labor peace as preventing the potential confusion and conflict
that could arise if rival labor unions with different views sought to bargain
with an employer.65 She reasons that this argument only supports a union’s
right to exclusive representation, not its right to compel employees to pay
union agency fees.66 Friedrichs also asserts that the government’s interest in
labor peace is only implicated if Respondents can demonstrate agency fees
are essential to a union’s survival. Because public-sector unions are
“flourishing” in right-to-work states, the government’s interest in labor
peace does not withstand scrutiny.67
Second, Friedrichs rejects the government’s interest in compelling
agency fees as a means to prevent free-riding. She again contends that
	
  
58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 14-915 (U.S. Nov.
6, 2015) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
59. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 4, at 9.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 10–11.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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preventing the compulsion of agency fees will not bankrupt unions, and
thus the government’s interest in “preventing ‘free-riding’” does not
withstand exacting scrutiny.68 Additionally, Friedrichs argues those
employees that reject their union’s policies obviously are not free-riding on
the policies they reject.69
2. Respondents’ Argument
The Respondents urge the Court to uphold Abood because it “correctly
reflects”70 the principle that a state’s interest in managing its workforce
justifies infringing an employee’s First Amendment interests through
imposed agency-fees.71 The Respondents first argue that Friedrichs
incorrectly challenged agency fees on the theory that it cannot survive
exacting scrutiny. As reflected in Abood, the Court recognizes that First
Amendment analysis differs depending on whether the government is
acting as an employer or regulator.72 Respondents point to Pickering v.
Board of Education, and note that the Court previously held that if “the
employee is not speaking ‘as a citizen’ and ‘on a matter of public concern,’
‘the employee has no First Amendment cause of action.’”73 Accordingly,
the Respondents claim compelled agency fees collected for the purpose of
collective bargaining are constitutionally justified, as they are a form of
employee speech that is not a matter of public concern.74 Respondents
claim this distinction between the government acting as an employer and a
regulator is critical to prevent public employees’ speech from “interfer[ing]
with the efficient and effective operation of government.”75
Second, Respondents point out public employees’ First Amendment
interests against compelled agency fees are “certainly not stronger than the
interest in affirmative expression.”76 On the contrary, Respondents claim
mandatory fees are actually less restrictive of First Amendment interests
because they retain the public employees’ right to express themselves as
	
  
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id.
70. Brief for Union Respondents, supra note 14, at 11.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 19 (noting that “the Government has a much freer hand in dealing ‘with citizen
employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large’”).
73. Id. at 20.
74. See id. at 25 (“Collective bargaining . . . [is] employee speech because [it] fall[s] within the
State’s internal personnel administration process for dealing with employment terms and conditions and
thus fall[s] squarely within the State’s prerogative to manage its workplace.”).
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 24.
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citizens.77
Third, Respondents contend that even if there were reasons to question
Abood, the Court should at the minimum reaffirm the case based on stare
decisis.78 Respondents point out that “strong reliance interests have
developed around the agency-shop model,” and note outlawing agencyshop agreements would overrule the “judgments of 23 States plus the
District of Columbia.”79 Further, they claim that if the Court were to outlaw
agency-shop agreements, tens of thousands of collective-bargaining
agreements governing public employees would be thrown into disarray.80
IV. ANALYSIS
It is likely that the Court will rule in favor of the California Teachers
Association and the other respondents, and reaffirm the constitutionality of
agency-shop agreements. First, if the Court overturns Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education and holds that compelling non-members to pay agency
fees violates the First Amendment, the Court will contradict its precedent
regarding employee speech, and may limit the First Amendment rights of
unions and paying members.81 Second, even if the Court finds Friedrichs’s
argument convincing, the Court will likely find Friedrichs failed to show
special justification to overcome the doctrine of stare decisis.
A. The First Amendment Rights of Public Employees and the Right of the
Government to Maintain Control of Its Workforce
Following Abood, the Court has consistently found the government
“has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts . . . as employer.”82
The principle remains true in cases in which the state is the proprietor in
managing its workforce, and is not the direct employer.83 Of course, a
citizen does not lose his First Amendment rights by becoming a public
	
  
77. Id.
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id.
81. Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of
Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 461–70 (2015).
82. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp.
High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1986) (“[T]he State has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”); see also Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t. of Agric.,
553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008) (“[G]overnment has significantly greater leeway in its dealing with citizen
employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”).
83. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 148 (2011).
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employee.84 However, a citizen’s First Amendment rights are circumscribed
when he accepts public employment85 because his rights are balanced
against the government’s “substantial interest” to act as an effective
employer.86 Indeed, the Court has warned against constitutionalizing
employee speech relating to terms of employment,87 noting the government
has “broad authority” to supervise the conduct of public employees.88
Similarly, Justice Kagan, in dissent in Harris v. Quinn, declared that
“except in narrow circumstances [the Court will] not allow an employee to
make a ‘federal constitutional issue’ out of basic ‘employment matters,
including . . . pay, discipline, promotions, [and] leave.’”89
Public employees lack First Amendment protection for speech that is
related to their terms of employment.90 Collective bargaining—contrary to
Friedrichs’s argument—merely involves speech-related terms of
employment.91 Therefore, the Court should follow its precedent and find
that requiring agency fees for the purposes of collective bargaining falls
outside First Amendment protection.
Even if the Court were to find agency fees implicate the First
Amendment, they should still hold in favor of Respondents. The Court
should hold that any limited burden on the First Amendment rights of
dissenting non-members is outweighed by the government’s benefit of
having effective and efficient management of its workforce.92 In other
words, the Court should reaffirm the government’s “broad authority” to
manage its workforce.93 If the Court were to rule in favor of Friedrichs, the
decision would be—borrowing from Justice Alito—“something of an
anomaly”94 and would overturn years of Court precedent regarding publicemployee speech claims.
If the Court holds that statutes that enable unions to require agency fees
	
  
84. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
85. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
86. See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011) (“The government has
a substantial interest in ensuring that all of its operations are efficient and effective.”).
87. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
88. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2494.
89. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2655 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct.
at 2496).
90. Benjamin Sachs, Harris v. Quinn: The Context of First Amendment Claims, ON LABOR (Jan.
20, 2014), http://onlabor.org/2014/01/20/harris-v-quinn-the-context-of-first-amendment-claims/.
91. Id.
92. Ann Hodges, Symposium: Public-sector Unions, Labor Relations, and Free Speech,
SCOTUSBLOG, (August 25, 2015 10:15 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/symposium-publicsector-unions-labor-relations-and-free-speech/.
93. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2494.
94. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012).
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from dissenting nonmembers is compelled speech, then forcing union
members to pay to support these members is also compelled speech.95
Accordingly, a ruling in favor of Friedrichs violates the First Amendment
rights of unions and its members by requiring them to subsidize the speech
of nonpayers.96 Plus, in theory, unions and their members have their
resources that they can spend on political activities limited by free-riders,
which further infringes their First Amendment rights.97 Put simply, if the
Court were to overrule Abood and hold that forcing dissenting nonmembers to pay agency fees is a violation of their First Amendment rights,
the Court would in effect violate the First Amendment rights of unions and
its paying members.98 Therefore, the Court reaffirming Abood’s
requirement that fees can only be collected for purposes of collective
bargaining would represent a reasonable compromise in a situation “with
conflicting First Amendment rights at stake.”99
B. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Even if the Court finds that Friedrichs’s argument is stronger, the
“Court has always held that ‘any departure’ from precedent ‘demands
special justification.’”100 Abood’s principles have become embedded in the
law, as well as public-sector employment relationships.101 Until very
recently, the Court has re-affirmed and cited favorably Abood’s principle
that distinguishes agency fees collected for the cost of collective bargaining
and those of political activity.102 Further, more than twenty states have
statutes that explicitly authorize agency-shop agreements, which has
resulted in thousands of multi-year contracts between state governments
and public-sector unions.103 The Court has previously held that stare decisis
is of increased importance when overturning precedent would require
States to amend their statutes and affect contracts.104
	
  
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ANN C. HODGES, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW & POL’Y, FRIEDRICHS V. CALIFORNIA
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION: THE AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS SYSTEM IN JEOPARDY 11 (Nov. 12, 2015).
100. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct 2618, 2651 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v.
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
101. Id. at 2651–52.
102. See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 213–14 (2009); Lehnert v. Ferris Facult. Ass’n., 500
U.S. 507, 519 (1991); Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455–57 (1984); see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at
2652 (pointing out the Court had not indicated it had any problem with Abood until Knox in 2012).
103. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2652.
104. Id. at 2652.
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The Friedrichs’s primary argument is that Abood is self-contradictory,
and thus unworkable, and violates the First Amendment rights of dissenting
nonmembers because all public sector collective bargaining is inherently
political.105 The petitioners in Abood made the same arguments, but the
Abood Court rejected them. The Court noted,
There can be no quarrel with the truism that because public employee
unions attempt to influence governmental policymaking, their activities
and the views of members who disagree with them may be properly
deemed political. But that characterization does not raise the ideas and
beliefs of public employees onto a higher plane than the ideas and
106
beliefs of private employees.

Abood recognized the political character of public-sector bargaining,
yet held agency-shop agreements do not violate the First Amendment rights
of dissenting nonmembers.107 Although the petitioners in this case have
changed, their arguments remain the same as those that were rejected by
the court in Abood.108 Here, Friedrichs merely rehashes old arguments and
catalogs alleged errors committed in Abood, which is not sufficient to
overcome the doctrine of stare decisis.109
Friedrichs argues that “the right of the citizen not to be subjected to
unconstitutional treatment outweighs any reliance or predictability interests
of stare decisis.”110 Essentially, special justification is not needed if it
involves denial of a constitutional right.111 However, if the Court begins
simply overruling precedent, what happens to society’s view of the Court
as legitimate and stable?112 Certainly, some cases should be overturned.
Here, however, the Court should not overrule Abood—which has worked
“reasonably well”113—because there is no “basic principle here that’s
erroneous.”114 There is simply no special justification for the Court to
overrule Abood.
	
  
105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 14.
106. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
107. See id. at 209 (finding agency-shop clauses are valid).
108. HODGES, supra note 99, at 7.
109. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2652 (noting that “[t]he special justifications needed to reverse an
opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point
of stare decisis”).
110. Howe, supra note 5.
111. Id.
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No.14-915 (Jan. 11,
2016).
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id. at 33.
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CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which
held constitutional state statutes that enable public-sector unions to require
agency fees from dissenting nonmembers, should be left untouched. The
Court cannot overturn Abood without violating its precedent regarding First
Amendment restrictions on employee speech. Plus, a ruling in favor of
Friedrichs may infringe on the First Amendment rights of unions and
paying members.115 Finally, even if the Court finds merit in Friedrichs’s
argument, it will not find the special justification needed to overcome the
doctrine of stare decisis. Friedrichs’s attempt to escape paying agency fees
should be rejected by this Court.

	
  
115.

Fisk and Poueymirou, supra note 81, at 461–70.

